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NOTES
FEE AWARDS FOR PRO SE ATTORNEY AND NONATTORNEY
PLAINTIFFS UNDER THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT
INTRODUCTION

Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA or Act)'
in 1966 to encourage openness in the operation of government agencies and to provide for citizen access to government information in
order to facilitate the informed deliberation essential to self-government.2 In 1974, when it became clear that the Act was not serving

1. Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552 (1982)). The Act requires federal agencies to publish or make available for
inspection a wide variety of descriptions, rules, statements, opinions, manuals, and
records. Id. The FOIA specifically exempts from its requirements nine categories of
government information: (1) defense or foreign policy documents classified pursuant
to executive order, (2) matters related solely to internal personnel practices of the
agency, (3) information specifically exempted by statute, (4) trade secrets and privileged commercial information, (5) inter-agency or intra-agency documents that
would not be available to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency,
(6) personnel and other files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (7) certain investigatory records compiled
for law enforcement purposes, (8) matters related to reports prepared for an agency
responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions, or (9) geological
or geophysical information and data concerning wells. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982).
"[T]he exemptions in the FOIA were not intended by Congress to be used either to
prohibit disclosure of information or to justify automatic withholding of information.
Rather, they merely mark the outer limits of information that may be withheld .... " Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Freedom of
Information Act Source Book 2 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as FOIA
Source Book].
2. H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1966) ("A democratic society
requires an informed, intelligent electorate, and the intelligence of the electorate
varies as the quantity and quality of its information varies."), reprintedin 1966 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 2418, 2429, and in FOIA Source Book, supra note 1, at 33;
S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1965) ("[A]n informed electorate is vital to
the proper operation of a democracy.
...
), reprintedin FOIA Source Book, supra
note 1, at 38; see H.R. Rep. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1972) ("Congress
passed the Freedom of Information Act in response to a persistent problem ...of
obtaining adequate information to evaluate Federal programs and formulate wise
policies. Congress recognized that the public cannot make intelligent decisions without such information ....") (quoting Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C.
Cir. 1971)), reprinted in House Comm. on Government Operations and Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Freedom of Information Act and
Amendments of 1974 (P.L. 93-502) Source Book 8, 84 (Joint Comm. Print 1975)
[hereinafter cited as Amdts. Source Book]; Kennedy, Foreward: Is the Pendulum
Swinging Away From Freedom of Information?, 16 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 311,
317 (1981) ("Public access to government information is a cornerstone of democratic
institutions.").
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these functions as well as Congress had intended, 3 Congress amended
The Freedom of Information Act as originally passed in 1966 was an attempt to
remedy the failures of § 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Pub. L. No.
404, cl. 324, 60 Stat. 237, 238 (1946), the "first Congressional attempt to formulate a
general statutory plan to aid in free access" to government information. FOIA Source
Book, supra, at 6. Section 3 of the APA, because of its vague wording and broad
enumeration of exceptions, quickly became a vehicle for agency secrecy rather than a
mechanism for disclosure. H.R. Rep. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted
in Amdts. Source Book, supra, at 9; H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6
(1966), reprintedin 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2418, 2422-23, and in FOIA
Source Book, supra note 1, at 26-27; S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965),
reprintedin FOIA Source Book, supra note 1, at 38.
The original FOIA required publication or disclosure by government agencies of a
wide variety of documents, Pub. L. No. 89-487, § 3(a)-(b), 80 Stat. 250, 250-251
(1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)-(2) (1982)), and set out nine
specific exemptions to the disclosure requirement. Id. at 251. The FOIA made three
major changes in the governmental disclosure system by (1) eliminating the APA
requirement that the requester be "properly and directly concerned" with the information, (2) placing the burden on the government to prove that the requested
information fit within an exemption, H.R. Rep. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1972), reprintedin Amdts. Source Book, supra, at 10, and (3) providing for judicial
review of agency denials of disclosure. H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2
(1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2418, 2419, and in FOIA
Source Book, supra note 1, at 23. Private litigation was to be the FOIA's enforcement
mechanism. See S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1965), reprinted in FOIA
Source Book, supra note 1, at 43; H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1966),
reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2418, 2426, and in FOIA Source
Book, supra note 1, at 30. The importance of judicial enforcement proceedings is
further evidenced by the provision that FOIA court actions be "expedited in every
way." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(D) (1982). It was clear, however, that "[t]he success of
the FOIA [was] .

.

. inextricably a function of the cooperative spirit with which the

agencies administer the Act." Note, The Freedomof Information Act: A Seven Year
Assessment, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 895, 908 (1974); see Nader, Freedom From Information: the Act and the Agencies, 5 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1970); Note,
Comments on ProposedAmendments to Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure
Act: The Freedom of Information Bill, 40 Notre Dame Law. 417, 441 (1964-1965).
3. See S. Rep. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Senate Report], reprintedin Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at 154-56; H.R. Rep.
No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1972), reprintedin Amdts. Source Book, supra
note 2, at 15-16. Especially discouraging were reports of bureaucratic foot-dragging
and agency delaying tactics. See H.R. Rep. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 20-42
(1972), reprinted in Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at 27-49; Katz, The Games
BureacratsPlay: Hide and Seek Under the Freedom of Information Act, 48 Tex. L.
Rev. 1261, 1262, 1284 (1970); Nader, supra note 2, at 5-13. Public interest and media
groups, who had been among the FOIA's main proponents in 1966, were making
little use of the statute. Senate Report, supra, at 17-18, reprinted in Amdts. Source
Book, supra note 2, at 169-70; H.R. Rep. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8, 16-17
(1972), reprintedin Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at 15, 23-24; see also Loftus,
New Freedom of Information Law: Fact-Seekers Testing Its Effectiveness, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 18, 1968, at 61, col. 2 ("Delay is often the equal of denial. What is news
today may be worthless tomorrow."), reprinted in Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
90th Cong., 2d Sess., The Freedom of Information Act (Ten Months Review) 183,
185 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Ten Months Review]. Many of the difficulties could
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the Act 4 to provide a more useful tool for citizens seeking government
information. 5 The 1974 amendments include a provision, section
(a)(4)(E) of title 5 of the United States Code, authorizing courts that
hear FOIA cases to "assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case...
in which the complainant has substantially prevailed." 6 A primary
purpose of this section was to encourage citizen suits to enforce the

be traced to the "cumbersome and costly legal remedy." H.R. Rep. No. 1419, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1972), reprintedin Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at 15.
The high cost of litigation meant that few requesters could afford judicial review
of agency denials of disclosure. H.R. Rep. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 73-74
(1972), reprinted in Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at 80-81. Those individuals
who could litigate were confronted with the tremendous legal and monetary resources of the government. Id. at 74, reprintedin Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2,
at 81; Senate Report, supra, at 3, reprintedin Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at
155. Furthermore, agency delays in filing responsive pleadings meant that information ultimately released would often be received too late to be of any use, especially
for the media. H.R. Rep. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 74-76 (1972), reprinted in
Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at 81-83; see Koch, The Freedom of Information
Act: Suggestions for Making Information Available to the Public, 32 Md. L. Rev.

189, 196-97 (1972). Congress did note that in the few FOIA cases that were litigated,
courts (especially in the District of Columbia) had been diligent in enforcing the
statute, H.R. Rep. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 70-73 (1972), reprintedin Amdts.
Source Book, supra note 2, at 77-80, and that in some cases the mere filing of a
lawsuit led to disclosure by the agency. Id. at 26, 73, reprinted in Amdts. Source
Book, supra note 2, at 33, 80; see Loftus, supra, at 61, col. 2, reprinted in Ten
Months Review, supra, at 184.
4. Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (codified as amended
at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982)). The 1974 amendments were passed over a veto by
President Gerald R. Ford. See Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at 398-480 & app.
1 (President's veto message).
Congress recognized that "the primary obstacles to the Act's faithful implementation by the executive branch have been procedural rather than substantive." Senate
Report, supra note 3, at 1, reprintedin Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at 153. Of
the eleven major changes made in the statute in 1974, nine were procedural provisions designed to ease citizen access to government documents and to facilitate
judicial review of agency refusals to disclose information. See Attorney General's
Memorandum on the 1974 Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act app. IIIB, attachment D, reprintedin Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at 571.
5. The general purposes of the 1974 amendments were "to facilitate freer and
more expeditious public access to government information, to encourage more faithful compliance with the terms and objectives of the FOIA, to strengthen the citizen's
remedy against agencies and officials who violate the Act, and to provide for closer
congressional oversight of agency performance under the Act." Senate Report, supra
note 3, at 1, reprinted in Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at 153.
6. Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § (b)(2), 88 Stat. 1561, 1562 (1974)
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1982)). The 1974 amendments also established
alternate venue in the District of Columbia for all FOIA actions.Id. at 1562 (codified
at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982)).
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substantive provisions of the FOIA,1 but the attorney fee section itself
has engendered a great deal of litigation. 8
One issue that has not been uniformly resolved is whether pro se
plaintiffs are eligible for attorney fee awards.9 This difficulty is further complicated when the pro se plaintiff is also an attorney. In the
District of Columbia Circuit, for example, fees are available for all

7. Senate Report, supra note 3, at 18, reprintedin Amdts. Source Book, supra
note 2, at 170; The Freedom of Information Act: Hearingson H.R. 5425 and H.R.
4960 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 272 (1973) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings] (testimony of John Shattuck,
Staff Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union). See infra note 52 and accompanying
text.
8. Of the 1751 FOIA cases reported by the Justice Department as of September
1983, more than 10% involved disputes over the attorney-fee provision. Office of
Information and Privacy, United States Dep't of Justice, Freedom of Information
Case List 289 (1983).
9. The majority position is that pro se plaintiffs are not eligible for fee awards
under § (a)(4)(E). Wolfel v. United States, 711 F.2d 66, 68 (6th Cir. 1983); Clarkson
v. IRS, 678 F.2d 1368, 1371 (11th Cir. 1982); Cunningham v. FBI, 664 F.2d 383,
388 (3d Cir. 1981); Barrett v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087, 1090 (5th Cir.
1981) (suit under Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982), and FOIA; court applied
FOIA criteria), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982); Crooker v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 632 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1980); Burke v. United States Dep't of Justice, 559
F.2d 1182, 1182 (10th Cir. 1977), aff'g 432 F. Supp. 251, 253 (D. Kan. 1976); cf.
Pitts v. Vaughn, 679 F.2d 311, 313 (3d Cir. 1982) (no award to pro se litigant under
the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976 & Supp.
V 1981)); Cofield v. City of Atlanta, 648 F.2d 986, 987 (5th Cir. 1981) (same); Lovell
v. Snow, 637 F.2d 170, 171 (1st Cir. 1981) (same); Davis v. Parratt, 608 F.2d 717,
718 (8th Cir. 1979) (same); White v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 614 F.2d 387, 389
(4th Cir.) (no fee award to pro se litigant under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15
U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (1982)), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 923 (1980); Hannon v. Security
Nat'l Bank, 537 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir. 1976) (same). A minority of courts, chiefly in
the District of Columbia Circuit, has allowed pro se plaintiffs to collect fee awards.
Crooker v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, 663 F.2d 140, 141 (D.C. Cir.
1980)(per curiam); Cox v. United States Dep't of Justice, 601 F.2d 1, 5-6 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (per curiam); Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Jones
v. United States Secret Service, 81 F.R.D. 700, 702 (D.D.C. 1979); Marschner v.
United States Dep't of State, 470 F. Supp. 196, 201 (D. Conn. 1979); Holly v. Acree,
72 F.R.D. 115, 116 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd by order sub nom. Holly v. Chasen, 569
F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Second Circuit has indicated that it might approve a
fee award to a pro se litigant who can show that prosecution of the FOIA suit
diverted time from income-producing activity. Crooker v. United States Dep't of the
Treasury, 634 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1980). For general discussions of the issue of pro se
eligibility for FOIA attorney fees, see Note, Attorney Fees ForPro Se PlaintiffsUnder
the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts, 63 B.U.L. Rev. 443 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Attorney Fees]; Comment, Pro Se Litigant'sEligibilityfor Attorney Fees
Under FOIA: Crooker v. United States Department of Justice, 55 St. John's L. Rev.
520 (1981); 27 Vill. L. Rev. 1244 (1981-1982); 24 Wayne L. Rev 1045 (1978);
Annot., 56 A.L.R. Fed. 573 (1982).
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plaintiffs,' ° whereas in the Sixth Circuit, no pro se plaintiffs are
eligible for fees." Finally, the Fifth Circuit has held that although
section (a)(4)(E) awards generally are not available for pro se plaintiffs, a pro se plaintiff is eligible for a fee award if he or she is an
2
attorney.'
This Note argues that the purposes of the Act are best furthered if
all plaintiffs are eligible for attorney fee awards. Part I analyzes the
application of section (a)(4)(E) when the complainant has proceeded
pro se. It argues that the wording of the provision is inconclusive but
that the policies that led to its enactment can best be effectuated if fee
award eligibility is construed to cover attorney and nonattorney pro se
plaintiffs. Part II discusses the valuation problems presented by pro se
legal work and concludes that the difficulty of these problems can be
minimized by the exercise of judicial discretion in accordance with the
policies underlying the Act.
I.

APPICATION OF SECTION

(a)(4)(E)

Application of section (a)(4)(E) requires judicial determination of
both the plaintiff's eligibility for and entitlement to an award of
attorney fees. The threshold eligibility criterion is that the complainant has "substantially prevailed.' 3 Judicial interpretations of this
criterion are nearly uniform. The plaintiff must establish that the
prosecution of the suit was reasonably necessary to secure the documents and that the action has had a substantial causative effect on the
disclosure of the requested information.14 Accordingly, it is not necessary that a court order directing disclosure be obtained to show that
the plaintiff has substantially prevailed.'- This standard prevents an

10. Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1977); cf. Ellis v.
Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227, 230-31 (9th Cir. 1980) (pro se attorney defendants granted
attorney fees in frivolous civil rights action).
11. See Falcone v. IRS, 714 F.2d 646, 647 (6th Cir. 1983); cf. White v. Arlen
Realty & Dev. Corp., 614 F.2d 387, 389 (4th Cir.) (no attorney-fee awards for pro se
plaintiffs under TILA), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 923 (1980); Duncan v. Poythress, 572
F. Supp. 776, 779-80 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (no attorney-fee award for pro se plaintiff
under § 1988).
12. Cazalas v. United States Dep't of Justice, 709 F.2d 1051, 1057 (5th Cir.
1983).
13. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1982).
14. Lovell v. Alderete, 630 F.2d 428, 432 (5th Cir. 1980); Cox v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 601 F.2d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Vermont Low Income
Advocacy Council v. Usery, 546 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir. 1976).
15. See, e.g., Lovell v. Alderete, 630 F.2d 428, 432 (5th Cir. 1980); Cox v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 601 F.2d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Cuneo v.
Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1364 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Vermont Low Income Advocacy
Council v. Usery, 546 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir. 1976); Kaye v. Burns, 411 F. Supp. 897,
902 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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agency from mooting the action by releasing the material before
judgment in an attempt to avoid fee liability.' 6
If the plaintiff has substantially prevailed, the plaintiff has met the
statutory threshold requirement for the award of attorney fees. At this
stage the court must also decide as a matter of law if pro se attorney
and nonattorney litigants are to be eligible for section (a)(4)(E)
awards. Once the plaintiff before the court is determined to have met
the threshold criteria, the decision whether the circumstances of the
17
case justify making the award is within the discretion of the court.
The Senate version of section (a)(4)(E)'5 included four factors to be
considered in the exercise of this judicial discretion: "[t]he benefit to
the public, if any, deriving from the case,"' 9 "the commercial benefit
to the complainant, ' 20 "the nature of his interest in the records

16. Nationwide Bldg. Maintenance, Inc. v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704, 709-10
(D.C. Cir. 1977); Marschner v. United States Dep't of State, 470 F. Supp. 196, 200
(D. Conn. 1979).
17. Lovell v. Alderete, 630 F.2d 428, 431 (5th Cir. 1980); Cox v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 601 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Vermont Low Income
Advocacy Council, Inc. v. Usery, 546 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir. 1976); Senate Report,
supra note 3, at 19, reprintedin Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at 171; see Blue
v. Bureau of Prisons, 570 F.2d 529, 533 (5th Cir. 1978); Nationwide Bldg. Maintenance, Inc. v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1977); 120 Cong. Rec. 6814
(1974) (remarks of Rep. Alexander).
18. S.2543, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § (a)(4)(E) (1974) (amendment proposed by
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary) [hereinafter cited as Senate Version], reprinted in
Senate Report, supra note 3, at 50-51, and in Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at
202-203 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1982)).
19. Senate Version, supra note 18, reprinted in Senate Report, supra note 3, at
50, and in Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at 202. The Senate Report noted that
under this criterion, fees ordinarily would be awarded to media and public interest
groups, but not to businesses which use the FOIA to obtain data about a competitor
or as a substitute for discovery in litigation with the government. Senate Report,
supra note 3, at 19, reprintedin Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at 171. Although
every FOIA plaintiff acts to some degree in the public interest, Cuneo v. Rumsfeld,
553 F.2d 1360, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1977), courts require a public benefit greater than
simple governmental compliance with the FOIA. See Blue v. Bureau of Prisons, 570
F.2d 529, 533 (5th Cir. 1978); Maxwell Broadcasting Corp. v. FBI, 490 F. Supp.
254, 257 (N.D. Tex. 1980). Emphasizing the congressional policy of FOIA disclosure
as a mechanism for good government, courts take into account the degree of dissemination and the likely public impact of the information. An increase in the fund of
information available for making political choices as a result of disclosure causes a
corresponding increase in the public benefit deriving from the case. Blue v. Bureau of
Prisons, 570 F.2d 529, 533-34 (5th Cir. 1978); see Cazalas v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 709 F.2d 1051, 1053-54 (5th Cir. 1983); Fenster v. Brown, 617 F.2d 740, 744
(D.C. Cir. 1979); Maxwell Broadcasting Corp. v. FBI, 490 F. Supp. 254, 257 (N.D.
Tex. 1980); Consumers Union v. Board of Governors, 410 F. Supp. 63, 64, (D.D.C.
1976).
20. Senate Version, supra note 18, reprintedin Senate Report, supra note 3, at
50, and in Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at 202. The Senate Report indicated
that under this criterion fees would generally be recovered by indigents and nonprofit
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sought, ' 21 and "whether the government's withholding of the records
sought had a reasonable basis in law."2 2 The Senate Report stated that
in a suit advancing the complainant's commercial interests, ordinarily
there would be no need to award fees to insure that the action is
brought.23 A fee award would be mandated in such a situation,
however, if the agency officials had been "recalcitrant in their opposition to a valid claim or [had] otherwise engaged in obdurate behavior. "24
The four factors were eliminated in conference because the committee believed that the existing law25 on fee awards recognized such
factors and that enumeration would be "too delimiting. 2 6 Nonethe-

public interest groups, but not by large corporate interests, and that news interests
were not to be considered commercial. Senate Report, supra note 3, at 19, reprinted
in Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at 171. This is interpreted as evidencing "a
preference for public interest groups, indigents and disinterested scholars over private commercial enterprises' efforts for disclosure." Blue v. Bureau of Prisons, 570
F.2d 529, 534 (5th Cir. 1978); see Veteran's Educ. Project v. Secretary of the Air
Force, 509 F. Supp. 860, 862 (D.D.C. 1981), af'd mem., 679 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Consumers Union v. Board of Governors, 410 F. Supp. 63, 64 (D.D.C. 1981).
21. Senate Version, supra note 18, reprinted in Senate Report, supra note 3, at
50-51, and in Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at 202-03. The Senate Report
envisioned that awards will generally be made when the requester's interest is scholarly or public-interest oriented, but not if it is of a frivolous or purely commercial
nature. Senate Report, supra note 3, at 19, reprinted in Amdts. Source Book, supra
note 2, at 171. For example, in a case in which a prisoner sought a United States
Marshal's manual containing information regarding prison security and weaponry,
the court described the relationship between the status of the plaintiff and the nature
of the request as "obvious and potentially ominous." Cox v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 601 F.2d 1, 7 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
22. Senate Version, supra note 18, reprinted in Senate Report, supra note 3, at
51, and in Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at 203. The Senate Report indicated
that under this criterion no fee should be awarded "where the government's withholding had a colorable basis in law [but that the court should award fees] if the
withholding appeared to be merely to avoid embarrassment or to frustrate the
requester." Senate Report, supra note 3, at 19, reprinted in Amdts. Source Book,
supra note 2, at 171. To meet this criterion, the withheld information need not in
fact be exempt, as long as the agency's belief that it is exempt is reasonable. Cuneo v.
Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1365-66 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see Kaye v. Burns, 411 F. Supp.
897, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
23. Senate Report, supra note 3, at 19, reprintedin Amdts. Source Book, supra
note 2, at 171.
24. Id., reprinted in Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at 171.
25. The Conference Report does not explain what it means by "the existing body
of law on attorney fees." H.R. Rep. No. 1380, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974) (conference report on 1974 amendments) [hereinafter cited as Conference Report], reprinted
in Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at 227 (also published as S. Rep. No. 1200, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6285, 6288).
26. Conference Report, supra note 25, at 9, reprintedin Amdts. Source Book,
supra note 2, at 227.
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less, courts have consistently relied upon the four guidelines in deter27
mining both entitlement to and amount of fee awards.
A. The Language of Section (a)(4)(E)
Whether attorney and nonattorney pro se plaintiffs are eligible for
section (a)(4)(E) awards is not made clear by the language of the

statute. The semantic debate focuses on the word "incurred" in the
phrase "reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably
incurred. 12 8 If "reasonably incurred" modifies only "other litigation
costs," reasonable attorney fees may be awarded regardless of whether
fee liability was actually incurred. 29 Under this reading of the provision, all pro se litigants would be eligible for fee awards.
On the other hand, it is plausible to interpret "reasonably incurred"
as modifying both "reasonable attorney fees" and "other litigation
costs." 30 Under this interpretation, "reasonable attorney fees ... reasonably incurred" mandates that the amount of the fee not be excessive and that the use of an attorney in the circumstances be reasonable. 3' In such a case, the statute would authorize a fee award only if
an attorney's services are used and a fee is incurred.
Alternatively, "incurred" may require an attorney-client relationship but not actual fee liability. Thus, as in civil rights cases, 32 a fee

27. The four criteria are to be weighed, Blue v. Bureau of Prisons, 570 F.2d 529,
534 (5th Cir. 1978); Nationwide Bldg. Maintenance, Inc. v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704,
714 (D.C. Cir. 1977), but "[e]ven when these factors were incorporated in the
proposed statutory language, they were 'intended to provide guidance and direction-not airtight standards.' " 559 F.2d at 714 (quoting Senate Report, supra note
3, at 19, reprintedin Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at 171). "By eliminating [the
four] criteria, the conferees [did] not intend to make the award of attorney fees
automatic or to preclude the courts, in exercising their discretion ...

to take into

consideration such criteria." Conference Report, supra note 25, at 9-10, reprintedin
Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at 227.
28. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1982).
29. See Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Holly v.
Acree, 72 F.R.D. 115, 116 (D.D.C. 1976), af'd by ordersub noma. Holly v. Chasen,
569 F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Marschner v. United States Dep't of State, 470 F.
Supp. 196, 201 (D. Conn. 1979); Attorney Fees, supra note 9, at 449-451.
30. See Clarkson v. IRS, 678 F.2d 1368, 1371 n.3 (11th Cir. 1982); Cunningham
v. FBI, 664 F.2d 383, 385 (3d Cir. 1981); Barrett v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d
1087, 1089 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982); Crooker v. United
States Dep't of Justice, 632 F.2d 916, 921 n.7 (1st Cir. 1980).
31. Clarkson v. IRS, 678 F.2d 1368, 1371 n.3 (11th Cir. 1982); Cunningham v.
FBI, 664 F.2d 383, 385 (3d Cir. 1981); Barrett v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087,
1089 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982); Crooker v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 632 F.2d 916, 921 n.7 (1st Cir. 1980); see Wolfel v. United States,
711 F.2d 66, 68 (6th Cir. 1983) (quoting Barrett, 651 F.2d at 1090); Maxwell
Broadcasting Corp. v. FBI, 490 F. Supp. 254, 256 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
32. See Davis v. Parratt, 608 F.2d 717, 718 (8th Cir. 1979) (§ 1988 fee award
"presupposes a relationship of attorney and client"); Johnson v. Georgia Highway
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award could be based on the reasonable value of or prevailing rate for
such services,33 even though that amount may not represent an actual

fee liability.
A related argument, sometimes called the "closed-shop philoso-

phy, '34 is that the statute provides for the award of "attorney fees"
and that only an attorney can qualify for attorney fees. 35 This lends
some support to the position that only attorney pro se plaintiffs should
be entitled to section (a) (4)(E) awards. It is equally plausible, however, to interpret the section as authorizing an award for legal services
regardless of whether they are performed by an attorney. A functional

Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 1974) ("[w]hether or not [the plaintiff]
agreed to pay a fee and in what amount is not decisive") (quoting Clark v. American
Marine, 320 F. Supp. 709, 711 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd, 437 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1971));
Miller v. Amusement Enters., Inc., 426 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 1970) ("[A]II .. .
that is required is the existence of a relationship of attorney and client, a status which
exists wholly independently of compensation.") (footnote omitted) (case arose under
attorney fee provision of 1964 Civil Rights Act); cf. Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 616 F.2d
598, 601-02 (1st Cir. 1980) (§ 1988 fee award for services of public interest organization), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980); Mid-Hudson Legal Services, Inc. v. G & U
Inc., 578 F.2d 34, 37-38 (2d Cir. 1978) (§ 1988 award to federally funded legal
services corporation); Sellers v. Wollman, 510 F.2d 119, 123 (5th Cir. 1975) (fee
award to TILA plaintiff represented by legal aid society).
33. Jordan v. United States Dep't of Justice, 691 F.2d 514, 523-24 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (fee award to unpaid law students is "to be nleasured by the market value of
the services rendered") (footnote omitted); Consumers Union v. Board of Governors,
410 F. Supp. 63, 65 (D.D.C. 1976) ("When... counsel serve ... for far less than
fair market compensation [to] further the public interest, the Court has the authority
to award them the actual value of their service.") (citation omitted); see Falcone v.
IRS, 714 F.2d 646, 648 (6th Cir. 1983) ("Both a client and an attorney are necessary
ingredients for an award of fees in a FOIA case."); Cazalas v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 709 F.2d 1051, 1060 (5th Cir. 1983) (Garwood, J., dissenting) (attorneyclient relationship, but not actual fee liability, is required for fee award) (quoting
Miller v. Amusement Enters., Inc., 426 F.2d 534, 538-39 (5th Cir. 1970)); Cunningham v. FBI, 664 F.2d 383, 385 n.1 (3d Cir. 1981) (fee award not foreclosed
when plaintiff employs counsel but incurs no fee); 120 Cong. Rec. 17020 (1974)
(remarks of Sen. Kennedy) ([C]ourts should "look to the prevailing rate on attorneys'
fees."). See infra notes 131, 132.
34. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 491-92 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring); see
Comment, Pro Se Litigant's Eligibility for Attorney Fees Under FOIA: Crooker v.
United States Department of Justice, 55 St. John's L. Rev. 520, 530 n.39 (1981).
35. See Barrett v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087, 1089 (5th Cir. 1981)
(services of attorney must be utilized and fees incurred), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950
(1982); Davis v. Parratt, 608 F.2d 717, 718 (8th Cir. 1979) (no § 1988 fee award to
pro se paralegal plaintiff); Hannon v. Security Nat'l Bank, 537 F.2d 327, 329 (9th
Cir. 1976) ("[Plaintiff] was not an attorney and could not provide attorney services.")
(TILA case); Burke v. United States Dep't of Justice, 432 F. Supp. 251, 253 (D. Kan.
1976) (no fee for "time and efforts" of pro se nonattorney litigants), aff'd, 559 F.2d
1182 (10th Cir. 1977).
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approach to the issue would recognize that pro se plaintiffs perform
36
essentially as attorneys in prosecuting their cases.
The plain language of the statute is susceptible to several interpretations, none of which is persuasive, 37 and there is no evidence that
Congress considered the pro se issue in wording the statute. Consequently, an analysis of the public policy concerns underlying the

enactment of section (a)(4) (E) is required to determine
the eligibility
38
of attorney and nonattorney plaintiffs for fee awards.

B. Policies Underlying Section (a)(4)(E)
Four distinct policies of section (a)(4)(E) may be identified. First,
the attorney-fee provision compensates FOIA complainants for the
costs of litigation. Further, it punishes past agency violations of the

Act and deters future violations. Finally, it provides an incentive to
citizen enforcement of the FOIA.
Section (a)(4)(E) was designed to compensate prevailing FOIA
plaintiffs by reimbursing them for attorney fees, 39 rather than to
reward them for prevailing. 40 The availability of such compensation
enables complainants to consult competent counsel equipped to
36. Holly v. Acree, 72 F.R.D. 115, 116 (D.D.C. 1976) ("[W]hen persons exercise
their right to represent themselves before the bar of justice they are in every sense
functioning as attorneys: they do research, file pleadings, and advocate their
cause."), aff'd by order sub nom. Holly v. Chasen, 569 F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
see Crooker v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, 663 F.2d 140, 141 (D.C. Cir.
1980)(per curiam); Jones v. United States Secret Service, 81 F.R.D. 700, 701
(D.D.C. 1979).
37. See Cazalas v. United States Dep't of Justice, 709 F.2d 1051, 1056 (5th Cir.
1983); Crooker v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, 634 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir.
1980).
38. Cf. 2A C. Sands, Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory Construction §§ 48.0148.03, at 181-197 (4th ed. 1973) (discussing use of legislative history in statutory
interpretation); Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum.
L. Rev. 527, 538-44 (1947) (discussing use of legislative purposes in statutory interpretation).
39. Senate Report, supra note 5, at 18-19, reprinted in Amdts. Source Book,
supra note 3, at 169-70; Cunningham v. FBI, 664 F.2d 383, 387 (3d Cir. 1981);
Crooker v. United States Dep't of Justice, 632 F.2d 916, 921 (1st Cir. 1980); Nationwide Bldg. Maintenance, Inc. v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see
Falcone v. IRS, 714 F.2d 646, 647 (6th Cir. 1983); Wolfel v. United States, 711 F.2d
66, 68 (6th Cir. 1983); Barrett v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087, 1090 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982); cf. Pitts v. Vaughn, 679 F.2d 311, 312 (3d
Cir. 1982) (§ 1988); Cofield v. City of Atlanta, 648 F.2d 986, 988 (5th Cir. 1981)
(same); Hannon v. Security Nat'l Bank, 537 F.2d 327, 328-29 (9th Cir. 1976) (TILA);
Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 579, 581 (D.D.C. 1981)
(Copyright Act).
40. See Falcone v. IRS, 714 F.2d 646, 647 (6th Cir. 1983); Cunningham v. FBI,
664 F.2d 383, 385 (3d Cir. 1981); Crooker v. United States Dep't of Justice, 632 F.2d
916, 920 (1st Cir. 1980); Nationwide Bldg. Maintenance v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704,
711 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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present genuine challenges to the Justice Department attorneys who
represent the agencies. 41 It encourages skilled lawyers to accept FOIA
cases from plaintiffs who might otherwise be unable to pay their
fees. 42 Section (a) (4) (E) was designed to remove the economic barrier

to litigation posed by high legal bills, thereby ensuring all citizens
equal access to judicial review of agency denials of requests for infor-

mation. 43 If the compensatory purpose is the sole policy underlying
the fee provision, pro se litigants should not be eligible for section
(a)(4)(E) awards because
they incur no fee liabilities for which they
44
may be compensated.
There is ample evidence, however, that Congress intended that the
fee award provision serve other goals. First, section (a)(4)(E) represents an attempt to deter dilatory tactics and other FOIA violations by
government agencies. 45 An agency faced with the possibility of paying
41. See Wolfel v. United States, 711 F.2d 66, 68 (6th Cir. 1983); Barrett v.
Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087, 1089-90 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
950 (1982); cf. Cofield v. City of Atlanta, 648 F.2d 986, 988 (5th Cir. 1981) (§ 1988);
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 1974) (1964
Civil Rights Act); Duncan v. Poythress, 572 F. Supp. 776, 778-79 (N.D. Ga. 1983)
(§ 1988); Grooms v. Snyder, 474 F. Supp. 380, 384 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (same).
42. Cunningham v. FBI, 664 F.2d 383, 387 n.3 (3d Cir. 1981); cf. White v.
Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 614 F.2d 387, 388 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 923
(1980) (TILA). But see infra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
43. Senate Report, supra note 3, at 18-19, reprinted in Amdts. Source Book,
supra note 2, at 169-70; see Falcone v. IRS, 714 F.2d 646, 647 (6th Cir. 1983); Wolfel
v. United States, 711 F.2d 66, 68 (6th Cir. 1983); Cunningham v. FBI, 664 F.2d 383,
387 (3d Cir. 1981); Barrett v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087, 1090 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982); Crooker v. United States Dep't of Justice,
632 F.2d 916, 921 (1st Cir. 1980); Nationwide Bldg. Maintenance, Inc. v. Sampson,
559 F.2d 704, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
44. Falcone v. IRS, 714 F.2d 646, 647 (6th Cir. 1983) ("The award of attorney's
fees to successful FOIA plaintiffs was intended to relieve plaintiffs with legitimate
claims of the burden of legal costs; it was not intended as a reward for successful
claimants or as a penalty against the government."); Wolfel v. United States, 711
F.2d 66, 68-69 (6th Cir. 1983) (Congress intended fee awards to be made "in those
instances in which the services of an attorney were utilized and fees incurred.")
(quoting Barrett v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087, 1089-90 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982)); Crooker v. United States Dep't of Justice, 632 F.2d
916, 921 (1st Cir. 1980) (interpreting § (a)(4)(E) to disallow "any award which
provides compensation in excess of actual costs incurred in prosecuting a suit vindicating a specific right.").
45. Senate Report, supra note 3, at 3, reprinted in Amdts. Source Book, supra
note 2, at 155; Cazalas v. United States Dep't of Justice, 709 F.2d 1051, 1057 (5th
Cir. 1983); Maxwell Broadcasting Corp. v. FBI, 490 F. Supp. 254, 256 (N.D. Tex.
1980); Kaye v. Burns, 411 F. Supp. 897, 902 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); see Blue v. Bureau of
Prisons, 570 F.2d 529, 534 (5th Cir. 1978) (threat of fee may enourage compliance
without litigation); Nationwide Bldg. Maintenance, Inc. v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704,
711 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (§ (a)(4)(E)'s purpose is to remove incentive for administrative
resistance); Marschner v. United States Dep't of State, 470 F. Supp. 196, 200 (D.
Conn. 1979) (same); 120 Cong. Rec. 6814 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Alexander) ("The
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a FOIA complainant's legal fees from its own budget40 will be encouraged to comply voluntarily with the Act and will be discouraged from
litigating when its case is weak.47 Without the availability of fee
awards, few suits will be brought to compel disclosure of government
information. 48 In such a situation, the citizen-suit mechanism of the
FOIA does little to encourage agency compliance with the Act because
the agency knows that most of its denials of FOIA disclosure requests
will not be challenged. The prospect of fee liability encourages the
agency to consider the strength of its arguments before forcing the
citizen to resort to litigation. 49 Furthermore, requiring an agency that
has acted unreasonably to pay the complainant's attorney fees out of
its own budget5 0 serves a punitive purpose. 51

committee feels that once the Government has to take full responsibility for litigating
indefensible cases, it will think twice before going to the mark in the first instance.");
Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A Seven-Year Assessment, 74 Colum. L.
Rev. 895, 959 n.359 (1974) (assessment of costs would result in fewer agency denials).
46. All fees and costs assessed against the defendant agency in FOIA litigation are
to be paid from that agency's budget. Senate Report, supra note 3, at 17, reprintedin
Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at 169; see Attorney Fees, supra note 9, at 452.
47. Senate Report, supra note 3, at 17, reprinted in Amdts. Source Book, supra
note 2, at 169; 120 Cong. Rec. 6810 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Thone); see Attorney
General's Memorandum on the 1974 Amendments to the Freedom of Information
Act app. III-B, at 17, reprintedin Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at 555 ("IT]he
attorneys fee provision increases substantially the likelihood that an agency will be
sued when it issues a denial having weak or doubtful justification.").
48. See Nationwide Bldg. Maintenance, Inc. v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704, 711
(D.C. Cir. 1977); Marschner v. United States Dep't of State, 470 F. Supp. 196, 200
(D. Conn. 1979); Davis, The Information Act: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 34 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 761, 805 (1967).
49. Senate Report, supra note 3, at 17, reprintedin Amdts. Source Book, supra
note 2, at 169; 120 Cong. Rec. 6810 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Thone); see Grooms v.
Snyder, 474 F. Supp. 380, 383 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (without fee provision, the government could frustrate the FOIA's purposes by litigating every request).
50. See supra note 46.
51. Cazalas v. United States Dep't of Justice, 709 F.2d 1051, 1057 (5th Cir.
1983); cf. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (1964 Civil
Rights Act); Cofield v. City of Atlanta, 648 F.2d 986, 988 n.4 (5th Cir. 1981) (§ 1988
case characterizing § (a)(4)(E) as a sanction for unfounded resistance to requests for
information); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 716 (5th
Cir. 1974) (1964 Civil Rights Act); Duncan v. Poythress, 572 F. Supp. 776, 779 (N.D.
Ga. 1983) (§ 1988); Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 579,
581 (D.D.C. 1981) (Copyright Act); Grooms v. Snyder, 474 F. Supp. 380, 383 (N.D.
Ind. 1979) (§ 1988). But see Falcone v. IRS, 714 F.2d 646, 647 (6th Cir. 1983);
Wolfel v. United States, 711 F.2d 66, 68 (6th Cir. 1983); Cunningham v. FBI, 664
F.2d 383, 385 (3d Cir. 1981); Barrett v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087, 1089
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982); Crooker v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 632 F.2d 916, 920 (1st Cir. 1980).
Congress' intent that § (a) (4) (E) serve punitive purposes is further evidenced by the
Senate Report's indication that in cases in which other factors militate against a fee
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The fee provision is also a positive incentive to citizens to litigate to

enforce the FOIA and thereby uphold the important public policy of
governmental disclosure.52 Congress contemplated that FOIA enforcement suits by private citizens would be the primary mechanism
used to further the public good of open government. 53 Thus, it is not
unreasonable that the public should in some cases bear the litigation
costs of both sides. 54 Congress sought to encourage more aggressive
challenges to agency denials despite the fact that FOIA disclosure may
not result in pecuniary benefit to the average requester. 5 It is therefore proper to interpret section (a)(4)(E) as an incentive to citizen
enforcement of the FOIA.

award, the court should nevertheless make the award if the agency has been recalcitrant or obdurate. Senate Report, supra note 3, at 19, reprinted in Amdts. Source
Book, supra note 2, at 171. In addition, Congress' punitive intent is demonstrated by
its provision in the 1974 amendments authorizing disciplinary proceedings against
agency personnel who have "acted arbitrarily or capriciously with respect to the
witholding." Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § (b)(2), 88 Stat. 1561, 1562
(1974) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(F) (1982)).
52. Cazalas v. United States Dep't of Justice, 709 F.2d 1051, 1057 (5th Cir.
1983); Lovell v. Alderete, 630 F.2d 428, 433 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1980); LaSalle Extension
Univ. v. FTC, 627 F.2d 481, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Cox v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 601 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Nationwide Bldg. Maintenance,
Inc. v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704, 715 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Maxwell Broadcasting Corp.
v. FBI, 490 F. Supp. 254, 256 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Jones v. United States Secret
Service, 81 F.R.D. 700, 701 (D.D.C. 1979); Kaye v. Burns, 411 F. Supp. 897, 902
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Holly v. Acree, 72 F.R.D. 115, 116 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd by order
sub nom. Holly v. Chasen, 569 F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Goldstein v. Levi, 415 F.
Supp. 303, 305 (D.D.C. 1976); see H.R. Rep. No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7
(1974), reprinted in Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at 126-27 (fee provisions
desirable for suits that advance a strong congressional policy); House Hearings, supra
note 7, at 272 (testimony of John Shattuck, Staff Counsel, American Civil Liberties
Union).
The Senate Report noted the "role of statutory allowance of attorneys' fees to
plaintiffs in encouraging individuals 'to seek judicial relief' for the purpose of 'vindicating national policy.' " Senate Report, supra note 3, at 18 (quoting Northcross v.
Memphis Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973) (per curiam)), reprinted in Amdts.
Source Book, supra note 2, at 170.
53. See supra note 7.
54. Without a fee provision, the citizen-plaintiff's taxes pay the government's
litigation costs. Senate Report, supra note 3, at 19, reprintedin Amdts. Source Book,
supra note 2, at 171 ("[I]t would seem tantamount to a penalty to require the
wronged citizen to pay his attorneys' fee to make the government comply with the
law."); H.R. Rep. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1972), reprinted in Amdts.
Source Book, supra note 2, at 81; see 120 Cong. Rec. 36866 (1974) (remarks of Sen.
Kennedy) ("Government agencies spend millions of dollars to promote dissemination
of information they want the public to have. It is not too much to ask that they use
some of these funds to provide the public and press with information they specifically
request.").
55. Congress in 1972 noted that corporations or private law firms constituted the
largest single group of FOIA requesters, H.R. Rep. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 73
(1972), reprintedin Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at 80, and sought through the
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C. Section (a)(4)(E) Policies in the Context of Pro Se Litigation
A fee award to a pro se complainant does not, strictly speaking,
constitute compensation for actual costs. Opponents of such section
(a)(4) (E) awards argue that pro se plaintiffs never assume the financial burden that Congress intended to ease by enacting the fee provi57
sion.-" The Senate Report refers to removing barriers to litigation,
and it can be argued that pro se plaintiffs face no such barriers
because they incur no legal bills and because the fee provision enables
them to hire attorneys. 58 This argument fails to recognize that pro se
plaintiffs do indeed face formidable barriers to judicial enforcement
of their FOIA rights.
Poor plaintiffs often must proceed pro se because they cannot retain

lawyers to represent them in FOIA cases.59 The fee provison may be

an insufficient incentive to a lawyer to accept a FOIA case on a
contingency basis for two reasons. First, the likelihood of substantially

prevailing is uncertain because the document that is the goal of the
litigation is unknown. 60 The plaintiff must challenge the government's
witholding of the material without knowing its contents or even if it
fee provision to ensure "that the average citizen can take advantage of the law to the
same extent as the giant corporations." Senate Report, supra note 3, at 18 (quoting
Sen. Thurmond), reprintedin Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at 170. By directing
courts, in their discretion, to look to the commercial nature of the request, Congress
indicated its desire to encourage FOIA litigation by average citizens who lack "substantial private and pecuniary incentive to pursue their claims." Lovell v. Alderete,
630 F.2d 428, 433 n.6 (5th Cir. 1980); see Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A
Seven-Year Assessment, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 895, 958 (1974) ("The benefits of the [as
yet unamended] Act have inured predominantly to private, not public interests. It is
the corporation seeking through disclosure an economic, competitive or legal advantage, not the common citizen seeking civic enlightenment, that has most often
challenged wrongful agency witholding of public information.").
56. Falcone v. IRS, 714 F.2d 646, 647 (6th Cir. 1983); see Cunningham v. FBI,
664 F.2d 383, 386 (3d Cir. 1981); Maxwell Broadcasting Corp. v. FBI, 490 F. Supp.
254, 256 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
57. Senate Report, supra note 3, at 17 ("Too often the barriers presented by court
costs and attorneys' fees are insurmountable for the average person requesting information, allowing the government to escape compliance with the law."), reprinted in
Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at 169.
58. See Crooker v. United States Dep't of Justice, 632 F.2d 916, 920 (1st Cir.
1980) (§ (a)(4)(E) eliminates obstacle of attorney fees and allows equal access to
judicial enforcement of statutory rights); Attorney Fees, supra note 9, at 454 ("Courts
denying pro se fee awards state that pro se litigants face no economic barriers to
litigation because the fee provisions enable the plaintiff to hire an attorney."). See
supra note 42 and accompanying text.
59. Robbins & Hermann, Pro Se Litigation, LitigatingWithout Counsel: Faretta
or for Worse, 42 Brooklyn L. Rev. 629, 678 (1976) ("[M]ost civil litigants approach
the courts pro se only when they have no other choice."); see Attorney Fees, supra
note 9, at 455-57 (discussing difficulty of obtaining an attorney in FOIA cases).
60. Attorney Fees, supra note 9, at 455 ("The attorney must litigate essentially in
the dark-arguing that the information is not exempt from disclosure without even
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exists at all. With this dearth of information about the object of the
suit, it is difficult to make an intelligent judgment as to the litigant's
chances of prevailing. Second, the fee award is discretionary and may
not be awarded even if the plaintiff does prevail. 6 1
In addition, pro se plaintiffs face economic barriers to litigation
that are not removed by the award of actual costs. Prosecution of a
lawsuit requires a significant investment of time and energy, and
courts have recognized the costs incurred by sacrificing work and
leisure time in order to conduct a FOIA suit. 2 This sacrifice is compounded because the value of the documents is often speculative
before release. Even if the suit is successful, the released documents
may not provide a pecuniary benefit. These inherent uncertainties
discourage the investment of personal time and resources. A section
(a)(4)(E) award to a pro se plaintiff would remove such obstacles to
litigation.
Government agencies may fear that section (a) (4) (E) awards to pro
se plaintiffs will provide an incentive to citizen suits and therefore will
greatly increase the amount of FOIA litigation, burdening the agencies and the courts.6 3 Such a result would not be contrary to congresknowing what the information is.") (footnote omitted); see H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1966) (before suing, citizen will not know the reasons for the
agency action), reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 2426, and in
FOIA Source Book, supra note 1, at 30.
61. See supra note 17.
62. E.g., Cazalas v. United States Dep't of Justice, 709 F.2d 1051, 1056 (5th Cir.
1983) ("Appellant amply demonstrated the costs she incurred, both from other work
foregone and in terms of personal energy, due to her pro se work."); Cunningham v.
FBI, 664 F.2d 383, 386 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding pro se litigants ineligible for section
(a)(4)(E) awards, but noting that "pro se litigants are likely to incur non-monetary
costs that might serve as the basis for compensation"); Crooker v. United States Dep't
of the Treasury, 634 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1980) (A barrier to the citizen's "ability to
secure compliance with the Act ... may well be presented by the prospect of having
... to forgo an opportunity to earn one's regular income ... in order to prepare and
pursue a pro se suit."); Holly v. Acree, 72 F.R.D. 115, 116 (D.D.C. 1976) (FOIA
policy furthered by allowing pro se plaintiffs "to recover fees for time spent in the
role of their own attorneys"), aff'd by ordersub noma. Holly v. Chasen, 569 F.2d 160
(D.C. Cir. 1977); see Lovell v. Alderete, 630 F.2d 428, 437 (5th Cir. 1980) (Clark, J.,
dissenting) ("[The pro se litigant's] time has value and he should be compensated for
it."); Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 579, 581 (D.D.C.
1981) ("To deny [a prevailing pro se] litigant attorney's fees [under the Copyright
Act] solely on the grounds that he did not incur any liability to pay attorney's fees
ignores the fact that a pro se litigant must forego other activities in order to prepare
and pursue his case.").
63. See letter from Malcolm D. Hawk, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to Rep.
Chet Holifield, Chairman of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations (Feb. 20, 1974)
(characterizing fee awards as particularly inappropriate "in a type of litigation which
can be initiated by anyone"), reprinted in H.R. Rep. No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
app. 1 (1974), and in Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at 139.
64. See supra notes 7, 52, 53 and accompanying text.
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sional intent.6 4 Congress perceived that agencies were delaying or not
complying with the Act and that the original FOIA was not being
sufficiently enforced by private litigation. 65 Accordingly, the 1974
amendments were designed to eliminate this problem by encouraging
suits. 6° Furthermore, Congress clearly intended that the agencies be
deterred from unnecessarily witholding information in the first instance.6 7 Invocation of any of the nine exemptions from the FOIA's
disclosure requirement is authorized but not mandatory, 68 and the

government is to litigate only strong cases. 69 Thus, even if the avail-

ability of fees causes more citizens to bring lawsuits when confronted
with agency violations of the FOIA, fewer such suits will be necessary
because agencies will have voluntarily complied with the Act more
frequently. The fee provision's deterrent effect on the agency there-

fore would offset somewhat the incentive to the citizen, and the
amount of FOIA litigation would not increase dramatically.
Concern that the availability of pro se fee awards will encourage

frivolous litigation is unfounded. It may be true that if potential FOIA
complainants consulted objective attorneys before commencing suits,
frivolous claims could be weeded out. 70 Even a lawyer representing

himself cannot serve an objective weeding-out function. 71 The statutory requirement that the complainant substantially prevail, 7 2 how-

65. See supra note 3.
66. See supra notes 3, 52.
67. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
68. H.R. Rep. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1972), reprinted in Amdts.
Source Book, supra note 2, at 10. See supra note 1.
69. See supra note 47.
70. See Falcone v. IRS, 714 F.2d 646, 647 (6th Cir. 1983) (fee provision intended
to encourage potential claimants to retain counsel, which might prevent unnecessary
litigation); Wolfel v. United States, 711 F.2d 66, 68 (6th Cir. 1983) ("Persons
contemplating legal action should be encouraged to consult with attorneys. Litigation may not be necessary.") (quoting Barrett v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087,
1089 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S 950 (1982)); Cunningham v. FBI, 664
F.2d 383, 386 (3d Cir 1981) ("[S]elf-representation does not supply the objectivity
and detachment that an outside attorney can provide as a check against groundless or
unnecessary litigation.").
71. Falcone v. IRS, 714 F.2d 646, 647 (6th Cir. 1983) ("An attorney who
represents himself in litigation may have the necessary legal expertise but is unlikely
to have the 'detached and objective perspective' necessary to fulfill the aims of the
Act.") (quoting White v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 614 F.2d 387, 388 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 447 U.S. 923 (1980)); see White, 614 F.2d at 388 ("[E]ffective legal
representation is dependent not only on legal expertise, but also on detached and
objective perspective. The lawyer who represents himself necessarily falls short of the
latter."), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 923 (1980). But see Cazalas v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 709 F.2d 1051, 1056 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding "little evidence . . . that the
purpose of the fee provision is to insure objective representation by an attorney. On
the contrary, the fee provision is designed to promote vigorous advocacy on behalf of
citizens seeking government information.
...) (emphasis in original).
72. See supra notes 13, 14 and accompanying text.
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ever, means that frivolous suits will not lead to fee awards. Once the
plaintiff meets this threshold the suit is by definition not frivolous.
The agencies' real fear may be an increase in what they regard as
frivolous document requests. However, the original FOIA's73 elimination of the Administrative Procedure Act's requirement that the requester be "properly and directly concerned" 74 with the information
evidences congressional intent that the FOIA mechanism be used for a
broad range of requests. In addition, the legislative history of the 1974
amendments reflects concern with underutilization of the FOIA, 75 so

an increased number of requests would comport with congressional
intent. Increased requests will not unduly hamper the government,
because in a vast majority of cases the agency need only release the
requested documents. 76 Moreover, because the awarding of attorney
fees is discretionary, and one of the factors to be considered is the
public interest in disclosure, judges are unlikely to award fees where
the request is frivolous.
Arguably, section (a)(4)(E) awards should be made only to attorneys, whether representing themselves or others, because the intervention of an attorney often leads to agency disclosure of the material
without litigation. 77 Unlike the average pro se complainant, an attorney may prevent needless litigation because of his or her ability to
resolve disputes. 78 It is clearly bad policy, however, to encourage
agencies to respond only to the overtures of lawyers and not to the
legitimate requests of lay citizens. Congress realized that the success of
the FOIA was dependent upon the degree of cooperation between
agencies and the public; 79 this cooperative spirit is not fostered if the
level of agency solicitude toward FOIA requests is a function of
whether the requester is, or is represented by, an attorney.80

73. Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250, repealedby Act of June
5, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54.
74. Pub. L. No. 404, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946), repealedby Act of Sept. 6,
1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 653.
75. See House Hearings, supra note 7, at 35 (remarks of Rep. Moorhead). See
supra notes 3, 52.
76. Cazalas v. United States Dep't of Justice, 709 F.2d 1051, 1056 (5th Cir. 1983)
("Where a request for information is justified, the government should respond
promptly by providing that information and no fee will be n ecessary."); see Senate
Report, supra note 3, at 41 ("[T]he government may likely disclose more information
), reprintedin Amdts. Source Book, supra note
to avoid suits in the first place .
2, at 193.
77. Wolfel v. United States, 711 F.2d 66, 68 (6th Cir. 1983); Barrett v. Bureau of
Customs, 651 F.2d 1087, 1089-90 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982).
78. Wolfel v. United States, 711 F.2d 66, 68 (6th Cir. 1983); Barrett v. Bureau of
Customs, 651 F.2d 1087, 1089-90 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982).
79. See supra note 2.
80. Lovell v. Alderete, 630 F.2d 428, 437 (5th Cir. 1980) (Clark, J., dissenting).
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Opponents of fee awards to pro se plaintiffs also cite "the specter of
fee generation." 81 The availability of such awards may encourage suits
brought solely to generate fees, making FOIA litigation a "cottage

industry"8 2 for prisoners and the underemployed.

3 Such

a practice is

more egregious when the fee-generating pro se plaintiff is an attorney.
This fear, however, is unrealistic. The agency can avoid having to pay
any fee by prompt disclosure of the requested documents or a legitimate claim of exemption.8 4 Furthermore, courts have the ability to
recognize fee-generating suits and to deny fees in such cases. 85 The
availability of this judicial discretion
makes it unlikely that fee genera86
tion will present a problem.
A fee award to a prevailing pro se plaintiff may constitute a windfall because, unlike the represented plaintiff, the pro se plaintiff need
not compensate an attorney. 7 Again, however, the court can consider
this factor in determining the fee amount. In addition, the importance
of the expressed congressional policy of open government may require
that an occasional pro se plaintiff receive a windfall in order to further
the other purposes88 of the fee provision.

It may be that courts deny pro se fee awards because such litigants
are regarded as unprofessional hindrances to the judicial process.8 9 It
81. White v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 614 F.2d 387, 388 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 447 U.S. 923 (1980); see Falcone v. IRS, 714 F.2d 646, 648 (6th Cir. 1983);
Cunningham v. FBI, 664 F.2d 383, 387 (3d Cir. 1981).
82. Crooker v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, 634 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir.
1980).
83. Id.; Falcone v. IRS, 714 F.2d 646, 648 (6th Cir. 1983); Wolfel v. United

States, 711 F.2d 66, 69 (6th Cir. 1983); Cunningham v. FBI, 664 F.2d 383, 386 (3d
Cir. 1981).
84. See supra note 76.
85. For example, Michael Alan Crooker, a federal prisoner, was the plaintiff in
reported decisions involving § (a)(4)(E) in three circuits in the same year. Crooker v.
United States Dep't of the Treasury, 663 F.2d 140 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam);
Crooker v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, 634 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1980); Crooker
v. United States Dep't of Justice, 632 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1980). Crooker was denied
fees in the First and Second Circuits. The District of Columbia Circuit remanded to
the District Court on the question of a fee award. In Cazalas v. United States Dep't
of Justice, 709 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1983), a case in which the FOIA requester was an
Assistant United States Attorney suing outside her official capacity, the court opined
that "it would be ludicrous to suggest that appellant sought out a chance for pro se
litigation to support her otherwise inactive practice." Id. at 1056.
86. Congress was aware of the possibility of fee generation. Rep. William
Moorhead, chairman of the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government
Information of the House Committee on Government Operations and sponsor of the
1974 FOIA amendments, termed it "preposterous." House Hearings,supra note 7, at
171.
87. See Cunningham v. FBI, 664 F.2d 383, 385 (3d Cir. 1981) ("cash bonus");
Crooker v. United States Dep't of Justice, 632 F.2d 916, 921 (1st Cir. 1980) ("windfall"). See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 39-55 and accompanying text.
89. Crooker v. United States Dep't of Justice, 632 F.2d 916, 920 (1st Cir. 1980);
see Wolfel v. United States, 711 F.2d 66, 68 (6th Cir. 1983); Barrett v. Bureau of
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is not unreasonable to assume that a lay litigant will be less skillful
than an attorney in conducting a lawsuit. Like the "closed shop
philosophy," 90 this judicial distaste for lay pro se litigation may support the idea of awarding fees only to pro se plaintiffs who are
attorneys. Like all FOIA litigants, however, a nonattorney plaintiff
must have substantially prevailed in order to be eligible for a fee
award. 9 ' He or she therefore must have been a fairly competent
litigator. More importantly, the pro se plaintiff's victory demonstrates
that a government agency has failed to comply with the requirements
of the FOIA. Pro se plaintiffs thus further the public interest in
governmental disclosure as effectively as represented plaintiffs and
serve the congressional policies underlying the fee provision equally
well.
D. Interpreting Section (a)(4)(E) to Effectuate the Policies
Underlying the FOIA
Courts have reached differing results in interpreting section
(a) (4) (E) in cases involving attorney and nonattorney pro se plaintiffs.
The Fifth Circuit has attempted to distinguish between the two
groups, holding that pro se plaintiffs are eligible for fee awards only if
they are attorneys. 92 The court recognized that the fee provision serves
incentive,9 3 deterrent, 94 and punitive 95 functions, in addition to compensating for litigation costs.9 6 Two years earlier, however, the same
court held that these functions were insufficient to justify finding a
nonattorney pro se plaintiff eligible for a section (a)(4)(E) award. 7
The court attempted to distinguish the two cases on the basis that the
attorney pro se plaintiff used legal skills to vindicate FOIA rights,
while the lay pro se plaintiff did not. 98 It gave no indication, however,
Customs, 651 F.2d 1087, 1089-90 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982);
Comment, Pro Se Litigant'sEligibility For Attorney Fees Under FOIA: Crooker v.
United States Department of Justice, 55 St. John's L. Rev. 520, 529 and nn. 36 & 37

(1981).
90. See supra notes 34, 35 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 13, 14 and accompanying text.
92. Cazalas v. United States Dep't of Justice, 709 F.2d
1983).
93. Id. at 1057. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying
94. Cazalas v. United States Dep't of Justice, 709 F.2d
1983). See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
95. Cazalas v. United States Dep't of Justice, 709 F.2d
1983). See supra notes 50, 51 and accompanying text.
96. Cazalas v. United States Dep't of Justice, 709 F.2d
1983). See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
97. Barrett v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087, 1090
denied, 455 U.S. 950 (1982).
98. Cazalas v. United States Dep't of Justice, 709 F.2d
1983).

1051, 1057 (5th Cir.
text.
1051, 1057 (5th Cir.
1051, 1057 (5th Cir.
1051, 1057 (5th Cir.
(5th Cir. 1981), cert.
1051, 1057 (5th Cir.
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why or how the fact that the pro se litigant was an attorney had
altered its earlier interpretation of the policies underlying section
(a)(4) (E) .9
A more consistent and defensible view, assuming that pro se plaintiffs in general have been held to be ineligible for attorney fee awards,
is that pro se attorney plaintiffs should be similarly treated. 100 There is
no evidence that Congress intended to discriminate between pro se
plaintiffs on the basis of whether they are members of the bar.
The best view is that all plaintiffs should be eligible for section
(a) (4) (E) awards.' 0 ' This liberal interpretation of the fee provision will
best serve the FOIA's purposes of achieving agency openness and wise
self-government. If all FOIA plaintiffs are eligible for fee awards, it
can only enhance the purposes of section (a)(4)(E): to compensate
for10 2 and encourage litigation of'0

3

agency denials and to deter 10

4

and

99. A recent district court case, Duncan v. Poythress, 572 F. Supp. 776 (N.D.
Ga. 1983), characterized the Cazalas court's attempt to distinguish between the two
classes of pro se litigants as unconvincing. Id. at 780. The Duncan court held that
because no pro se litigants in the Fifth Circuit were eligible for § 1988 fee awards,
Cofield v. City of Atlanta, 648 F.2d 986, 987 (5th Cir. 1981), it could not make an
award to an attorney pro se plaintiff. The court found no rational basis for treating
the pro se litigant differently because he happened to be an attorney. 572 F. Supp. at
779-80.
100. Falcone v. IRS, 714 F.2d 646, 648 (6th Cir. 1983).
101. E.g., Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 552 F.2d 1360, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Holly v.
Acree, 72 F.R.D. 115, 116 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd by ordersub nom. Holly v. Chasen,
569 F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In Cuneo, for example, a lawyer sued to obtain
documents containing government standards for awarding contracts, in the belief
that these standards would assist him in advising government contractors. He was
represented by his law partners and was considered by the court to be proceeding pro
se. Id. at 1366. Although the plaintiff was eligible for the fee award, the Cuneo court
suggested that the district court might want to deny the award because of, among
other things, the plaintiff's commercial interest in the documents. Id. at 1368. In a
factually similar case, Cliff v. IRS, 529 F. Supp. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), a tax attorney
represented by his partners was denied a fee award because of his commercial
interest in the documents and the reasonableness of the agency's denial of his request.
Id. at 17. In reaching this decision, the court made no mention of the fact that the
plaintiff had incurred no fee.
Furthermore, the District Court of the District of Columbia has observed that:
no rational ground exists upon which to distinguish awards to [lawyers]
from persons such as plaintiff who also function in the role of attorney on
their own behalves, merely because one happens to be a member of the bar
and the other does not. Such a distinction would be arbitrary and would
erect a barrier to the vindication of FOIA rights, contrary to the intent of
Congress.
Holly v. Acree, 72 F.R.D. 115, 116 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd by ordersub nom. Holly v.
Chasen, 569 F.2d 160 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
102. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
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punish 0 5 agency recalcitrance. These policies are strengthened by
granting awards to both pro se and represented complainants. Moreover, there is no principled basis for distinguishing between attorney
and nonattorney pro se plaintiffs.
Only the District of Columbia Circuit has given section (a)(4)(E)
this broad interpretation, allowing fee awards for all FOIA plaintiffs. 1 6 Congress in 1974 was aware of the District of Columbia
Circuit's expertise in administrative law and its vigorous and liberal
record in enforcing the FOIA,10 7 and specifically authorized venue in
the District of Columbia at the time it provided for the availability of
attorney fees.10 8 This indicates that Congress would approve of that
Circuit's leadership in liberally interpreting section (a) (4) (E).
II. VALUATION
The valuation of pro se legal work also requires inquiry into the
policies underlying section (a)(4)(E). The four factors that guide the
court's discretion in deciding whether to award the fee' 019 should also
guide the court in setting a fee amount for pro se litigants.
Compensation for the value of pro se legal work presents a problem
because fees are awarded when no costs have been incurred, and the
standard to be applied in valuing lay legal work is unclear." 0 Valuation may be less difficult when the pro se litigant is an attorney
because theoretically the value of the work foregone is equal to the
value of the work performed."' This does not, however, justify
awarding fees to pro se plaintiffs only if they are attorneys. Nonattorney legal work still has some calculable value, ll2 and the availability

105. See supra notes 50, 51 and accompanying text.
106. Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see Crooker v.
United States Dep't of the Treasury, 663 F.2d 140,141 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam);
Cox v. United States Dep't of Justice, 601 F.2d 1, 5-6 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam);
Jones v. United States Secret Service, 81 F.R.D. 700, 701 (D.D.C. 1979); Holly v.
Acree, 72 F.R.D. 115, 116 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd by order sub nom. Holly v. Chasen,
569 F.2d. 160 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
107. See Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at 112; H.R. Rep. No. 1419, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1972), reprintedin Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at 77; 120
Cong. Rec. 17017 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
108. See supra note 6.
109. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
110. Cunningham v. FBI, 664 F.2d 383, 386 (3d Cir. 1981); Crooker v. United
States Dep't of Justice, 632 F.2d 916, 921 (1st Cir. 1980); see Burke v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 432 F. Supp. 251, 253 (D. Kan. 1976) (referring to "arbitrary hourly
rates of compensation for the 'time and efforts' of pro se litigants"), aff'd, 559 F.2d
1182 (10th Cir. 1977).
111. Cazalas v. United States Dep't of Justice, 709 F.2d 1051, 1057 (5th Cir.
1983).
112. See supra note 62; infra notes 114, 131, 132.
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of fees under section (a) (4) (E) could not have been intended to turn on
the simplicity with which they can be determined.
One suggestion is that the fee award be based on "opportunity
cost"-the value of the time sacrificed by the pro se plaintiff in
conducting the suit." 3 One virtue of this approach is that it would not

give rise to fee generation because theoretically other uses of the
plaintiff's time are just as valuable as the pursuit of the claim. 114 The

Second Circuit has indicated some support for the opportunity-cost
approach, holding that it would not award fees to a pro se plaintiff
who had made no showing that prosecution of the suit had diverted
time from income-producing activity." 5
This approach has some economic appeal because it would permit
compensation for actual and opportunity costs, but it may lead to
disparity in awards. Those who earn a high hourly wage will receive
more than those who earn less," 6 and the amount of the fee award
will therefore vary in inverse proportion to the litigant's likely financial need." 7 This disparity does not justify denial of fee awards to pro
se plaintiffs, however, because the litigant's financial need is unrelated to the goals of the Act.
Yet, the court's analysis should not stop at consideration of how to
compensate the plaintiff. It must examine the other policies of section
113. The opportunity cost of a good or service is the real economic cost of production, considering what must be foregone in order to produce the good or service. It is
sometimes called user cost or alternative cost. Encyclopedia of Economics 719 (D.
Greenwald ed. 1982); see generallyAttorney Fees, supra note 9, at 462-67 (discussion
of opportunity cost valuation).
114. Attorney Fees, supra note 9, at 465-67. In addition, the cost to the agency
will probably be less than if an attorney had been employed. Id. at 467. See H.R.
Rep. No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974) (typical FOIA case estimated to require
40 hours of billable time, costing $1400 if billed at $35 per hour), reprintedin Amdts.
Source Book, supra note 2, at 129; Senate Report, supra note 3, at 41 (basic cost of
FOIA case estimated at $1000), reprinted in Amdts. Source Book, supra note 2, at
193. The cumulative value of such payments might, however, be significant enough
to serve the fee provision's deterrent, punishment, and incentive functions. See supra
notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
115. Crooker v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, 634 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir.
1980). It should be noted that the meaning of this decision is unclear. The court held
that it would not award fees at least if the litigant had not made a showing of income
diversion. The court has never stated, however, that it would award fees if the
litigant does make such a showing. See Kuzma v. United States Postal Serv., No. 836221, slip. op. at 823 (2d Cir. Jan. 3, 1984); In re Emergency Beacon Corp., 27
Bankr. 757, 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). If, however, the court's income-diversion approach were to be implemented, it presumably would lead to award eligibility for all
plaintiffs except prisoners and the unemployed.
116. Presumably the value of the time sacrificed by the pro se litigant is the value
of the time he or she would otherwise work.
117. Cunningham v. FBI, 664 F.2d 383, 387 (3d Cir. 1981); see 120 Cong. Rec.
36866 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy) ("[F]reedom of information should not be
for sale only to the highest bidder.").
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(a)(4)(E) and set a fee award that will best further the purposes of the
FOIA. The four factors of the Senate Report" 8 point to the policies
courts should consider.
Consideration of the plaintiff's interest in" 9 and benefit from' 20
obtaining the information is closely related to the policy of encouraging citizen suits to enforce the FOIA. 12 The greater the complainant's
commercial interest in and benefit from disclosure, the less a fee
award is needed as an incentive to suit. Accordingly, a large award in
such a case would be inappropriate.
Similarly, in considering the reasonableness of the government's
behavior,12 2 the policies of deterring'2 3 and punishing'2 4 agency violations of the Act come into play. The more reasonable the government's
withholding of the information, the less desirable it will be to deter
and punish such behavior. Consequently, a large fee award in such a
case would do little to further those purposes of section (a) (4)(E).
The final factor to be weighed by the court is the public benefit
derived from disclosure. 125 Throughout its consideration of the FOIA
and the 1974 amendments, Congress emphasized the essential role
played by freedom of information in wise government.126 Similarly, it
noted the critical role played by private citizens in effectuating that
freedom. 2 7 The public benefit resulting from disclosure is the goal of
the Act; 2 hence, the section (a)(4)(E) purposes of compensation,
deterrence, punishment, and incentive to suit are meaningful only to
the extent that they result in public benefit. An increase in the fund of
information available for making political choices as a result of disclosure causes a corresponding increase in the public benefit deriving
from the case. 129 In exercising its discretion in setting the fee amount,
therefore, the court should give special attention to the public benefit
resulting from the private litigant's suit. In this manner, the court will
exercise the discretion left it under section (a) (4) (E) to best further the
policies underlying the enactment of the FOIA.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 7, 52-55 and accompanying text.
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.

124.
125.
126.
127.

See supra notes 50, 51 and accompanying text.
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.

128. See supra note 2.
129. Blue v. Bureau of Prisons, 570 F.2d 529, 533-34 (5th Cir. 1978); see Cazalas
v. United States Dep't of Justice, 709 F.2d 1051, 1053-54 (5th Cir. 1983); Fenster v.
Brown, 617 F.2d 740, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Maxwell Broadcasting Corp. v. FBI,
490 F. Supp. 254, 257 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Consumers Union v. Board of Governors,
410 F. Supp. 63, 64 (D.D.C. 1976).
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When the public benefit from disclosure is high, the corresponding
increase in the pro se litigant's award could theoretically result in an
inequity. This is because in compensating the represented plaintiff the
court looks to actual costs, subject to the statutory requirement of

reasonableness, while the pro se litigant's award would be based upon
consideration of all four policies underlying section (a)(4)(E). 1° This
inequity is minimized, however, because the pro se award is subject to
the same requirement of reasonableness. As in other types of public
interest litigation, 1 31 courts may consider several factors 1 32 in calculating the maximum reasonable value of the legal work performed.
Thus, consideration of the public benefit in disclosure would not lead
to windfall awards to pro se litigants. In this fashion courts will be
able to calculate fee awards that serve as an incentive to plaintiffs
without overcompensating them and that also deter and punish
agericy violations of the FOIA.
CONCLUSION

The policies of the FOIA are best served if all plaintiffs are eligible
for section (a)(4)(E) awards. The legislative history of the 1974

130. If the public benefit from disclosure is very high, the pro se litigant's award
could in theory be larger than that of the represented plaintiff, because the lawyer's
fee does not vary with the public benefit. Similarly, when the public benefit is low,
the award to the pro se pldintiff will probably be less than the compensation awarded
to the represented complainant. This result is acceptable because both compensation
and the public interest are properly considered in the exercise of judicial discretion.
131. See supra notes 32, 33.
132. The American Bar Association lists several factors to guide in determining the
reasonableness of a fee: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of
the questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (2)
the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer, (3) the fee customarily charged
in the locality for similar legal services, (4) the amount involved and the results
obtained, (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (6) the
nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, (7) the experience,
reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services, and (8)
whether the fee is fixed or contingent. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR
2-106(B) (1980); see King v. Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024, 1026-27 (1st Cir. 1977)
(endorsing ABA standards), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978); Johnson v. Georgia
Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974) (same); cf. Jordan v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 691 F.2d 514, 524 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (discussing fee for
work of law students); Jones v. United States Secret Service, 81 F.R.D. 700, 702
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (fees of $10 per hour awarded but number of hours claimed halved
by the court); Marschner v. United States Dep't of State, 470 F. Supp. 196, 201 (D.
Conn. 1979) (award to pro se litigant computed at minimum wage rate of $2.65 per
hour); Quinto v. Legal Times of Washington, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 579, 582 (D.D.C.
1981) (reducing requested amount because pro se law student litigant could not
"charge defendant[s] for his education") (quoting Orgel v. Clark Boardman Co., 128
U.S.P.Q. 531, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), modified, 301 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1962)).
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amendments makes clear that private litigation was to be the primary
safeguard against noncooperative agencies, and the availability of fee
awards for all plaintiffs provides the greatest incentive to private
enforcement of FOIA rights and policies. Exposing the obdurate
agency to the broadest possible fee liability deters the government
from violating the FOIA and punishes it if it does. As the federal
government collects more information and makes less of it publicly
available, the most liberal interpretation of the FOIA is necessary to
ensure that the agencies do not prevent the disclosure so essential to
democracy.
A holding that attorney and nonattorney pro se plaintiffs are eligible for fee awards as a matter of law does not mean that a particular
complainant will receive a fee award. The fact that Congress clearly
left this decision to the discretion of the court shows confidence that
judges are capable of balancing competing interests and deciding fee
award cases in a manner that will best further the purposes of the
FOIA. Even if all plaintiffs-pro se or represented, attorney or nonattorney-were eligible for section (a) (4) (E) awards as a matter of law,
sound judicial discretion in deciding entitlement to the award would
guard against abuse of the attorney-fee provision.

Cathy Seibel

